Althusser\u27s Mirror by Strathausen, Carsten
Studies in 20th Century Literature 
Volume 18 






University of Oregon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl 
 Part of the French and Francophone Literature Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Strathausen, Carsten (1994) "Althusser's Mirror," Studies in 20th Century Literature: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 
7. https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1339 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Studies in 20th Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, 
please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
Althusser's Mirror 
Abstract 
Jacques Lacan significantly influenced Althusser's accounts of ideology and the subject. Althusser's 
belief that science is a discourse without a subject parallels Lacan's belief that in the Symbolic Order the 
Subject and the Other are alienated. Althusser's account of interpellation, which explains how ideology 
recognizes individuals as subjects, takes for granted Lacan's notion of the mirror stage. Althusser 
repudiates the plenitude of the subject, whose interpellation conceals its lack; Lacan shows that the 
subject's failure to express itself in language makes the subject a void. However, Althusser, whose subject 
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My attempt to read Althusser in the light of Lacanian psychoanaly- 
sis is based on the premise that Marxism should give more consideration 
to the individual's need for recognition and its question of identity than 
orthodox Marxism was willing to concede-a belief commonly held by 
most leftist intellectuals today. As Easthope pointed out, this shift of 
emphasis has been one of the major achievements of Althusser's work, 
and Althusser himself acknowledged his indebtedness to psychoanaly- 
sis.' In his essay "Freud and Lacan," he praises Lacan for having 
defined "as rigorously as it is possible" ("Freud" 156) the object of 
psychoanalysis (the unconscious), thus elevating psychoanalysis to the 
rank of a science-a statement clearly intended to parallel Lacan's 
achievements in regard to psychoanalysis (his return to Freud) with 
Althusser's understanding of his own merits in regard to Marxism (the 
return to Marx). In the following, I shall try to examine Lacan's 
influence on Althusser's work with respect to ideology and the subject, 
which I believe to greatly exceed that of a parallel or an occasional 
"borrowing" of concepts.' However, the objective of such a confron- 
tation is not merely to enlist all obvious differences between the source 
and its interpretation, but rather to concentrate on the positive potential 
of any appropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the understanding 
of ideology. 
Where I Think, I Am Not 
In his famous Essay "Ideology and Ideological State Appara- 
tuses," Althusser claims that ideology represents "the imaginary 
relation of . . . individuals to the real relations in which they live" 
("Ideology" 39). Contrary to the common understanding of ideology 
as 'false consciousness', where ideology is believed to distort or in any 
way mis-represent reality (i.e., the real relations of any given society, 
its relations of production), Althusser asserts that ideology is "above all 
the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of produc- 
tion" ("Ideology" 39). Ideology is thus "a second degree relation" 
(For Marx 233), for it does not primarily aim at the real relations of 
production (first degree relation); rather, it expresses the imaginary, but 
nonetheless "lived" relation between individuals and these relations of 
production (second degree relation).' 1
Strathausen: Althusser's Mirror
Published by New Prairie Press
62 S7'CL, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter, 1994) 
Ideology maintains this "imaginary" relation through the process 
of interpellation-it interpellates individuals as subjects. Interpellation 
works through a specular recognition-process between the individual 
(the "subject-to-be") and an Absolute Subject that functions as the 
"center" of each ideology, let us say God.' The voice of God calls the 
individual by its name and thus defines him/her as a free subject. By 
acknowledging its position, the individual also recognizes the superi- 
ority of the Absolute Subject that called it by its name (i.e., God). 
Hereby, the individual is "subjectivized" in a double sense: it is 
interpellated as a subject, but at the same time subjected to the Absolute 
Subject and thus active in history only in order to reproduce the existing 
relations of production. It is this mutual recognition between subjects 
and Subject that Althusser calls the "duplicate mirror-structure of 
ideology" ("Ideology" 54). This insight into how interpellation works 
can only be sustained with the help of science: 
ideology never says, 'I am ideological.' It is necessary to be outside 
ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in 
ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (general case): I was in 
ideology. As is well known, the accusation of being in ideology 
only applies to others, never to oneself (unless one is really a 
Spinozist or a Marxist . . .). ("Ideology" 49) 
It is obvious that the "quite exceptional case" Althusser mentions 
above presents itself in the form of a logical contradiction: Marxists 
know themselves to be inside ideology, but for this knowledge to exist, 
they must have already been in the realm of science and thus outside of 
ideology. Althusser acknowledges this paradox, claiming that he as a 
"subject" necessarily remains trapped in ideology, whereas "his" 
discourse analyzes ideology from the outside. This can only mean that 
scientific discourse is a "subject-less discourse" ("Ideology" 45); 
scientists as "subjects" are always absent from "their" discourse. This 
idea seems to mirror Lacan's account of the alienation between Subject 
and Other (the Symbolic Order). Lacan asserts that meaning emerges 
in the field of the Other that always excludes Being (the subject) (Four 
Fundamental Concepts, 211). Thus, Althusser concludes: 
it is literally no longer the eye (the mind's eye) of a subject which 
sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: 
it is this field itself which sees itself in the objects or problems it 
defines. (Reading Capital 25) 2




It is clear that Althusser's "field" and Lacan's "Other" are not quite 
the same, but it is more important here to realize that in Althusser's 
version, language has been assigned a key-role in the self-reflection 
process of a structural field when at the very same time it has been 
denied this function for human subjects.' Critics have argued that the 
repressed subjectivity of human individuals reappears as the subjectiv- 
ity of a structural field-"the return of the repressed" (Frank 128).6 
The argument is well taken, I think. According to Hindess and Hirst, 
Althusser calls his field "an ̀ eternity' in the Spinozist sense ofthe word: 
it is the cause of itself, it is infinite in its kind, and as itself it must 
necessarily exist"-this definition comes very close to the classical 
understanding of subjectivity (312). Althusser almost admits this 
himself when he states: 
Mlle true subjects (in the sense of the constitutive subjects of the 
process) are therefore not these occupants and functionaries, are 
not . . . "concrete individuals", "real men"-but the definition 
and distribution of these places and functions. The true "subjects" 
are these definers and distributors: the relations of production (and 
political and ideological social relations). (Reading Capital 180) 
He continues by saying that "these are relations" and therefore 
"cannot be thought within the category subject" (Reading Capital 
180). This explanation is hardly satisfactory, but it is indispensable for 
Althusser in order to distinguish radically between science and ideol- 
ogy. 
Althusser does indeed maintain this binary opposition throughout 
most of his writings and contends that truth can only be sustained 
through the logical coherence of the argument within a scientific 
discourse.' Ideology, however, is not simply "false," since the "imagi- 
nary" always comprises elements of the "real" (For Marx 233-34). 
Rather, ideology "is distinguished from science in that in it the 
practico-social function is more important than the theoretical function 
(function as knowledge)" (For Marx 231). The primary function of 
ideology is to interpellate individuals as subjects, and as such ideology 
"is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed 
and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of exist- 
ence" (For Marx 235).8 For Althusser, epistemological categories 
primarily apply to science and are of secondary importance in regard 
to ideology. Hirst goes even further than that. For him, the imaginary 
"cannot be false since it is not an idea or conception of things, but . . . 
a part of social relations." It follows that ideology "may derive from 3
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forms of the imaginary, but it is not false" (Hirst 38). Hirst presents 
ideology strictly as a matter of "lived relations" and his view is 
supported by Althusser's claim that ideology has a material existence. 
But ideology is material only because Althusser fully equates the belief 
in subjectivity with the action resulting from this belief: 
the existence of the ideas of his [the subject's] belief is material in 
that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material 
practices governed by material rituals which are themselves de- 
fined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the 
ideas of that subject. ("Ideology" 43) 
This materiality of ideology cannot of course be falsified. But one must 
not forget that the belief in something that does not exist (subjectivity) 
can have effects, but it cannot actually cause the existence of what is 
believed in. Humans are active in history but "considered as agents, 
human individuals are not 'free' and 'constitutive' subjects in the 
philosophical sense of the term" ("Reply" 134). For Althusser, 
originating subjects do not exist, and to believe in them is false in an 
epistemological sense. Eagleton, therefore, claims that besides his 
"positivist" view of ideology, Althusser equally endorses a "rational- 
ist" view which "relegates ideology to the false 'other' of true 
knowledge" (153) and charges Hirst with collapsing the epistemologi- 
cal question into the ontological one: although it is true that people 
actually believe in subjectivity and live accordingly, it is nonetheless 
false to believe in it, because subjectivity itself does not exist (153). In 
other words: it is crucial to distinguish between the epistemologically 
"false" belief in subjectivity and the actual existence and conse- 
quences of such false beliefs. 
Strictly speaking, this can only mean that the subjective view-point 
is not "false," but simply impossible, because its agent (Trager), the 
originating subject, does not really exist. What does exist are subject- 
agents of ideology, who try to occupy the impossible position of 
subjectivity by acting "as if" they were subjects. So Eagleton's 
conclusion that the "subject-centered view of reality" is "bound to get 
things wrong" can only be understood in the following way: a true 
"subject-centered view of reality" is impossible, so that everybody 
who believes him or herself to maintain this perspective occupies 
"some deceptively 'centered' standpoint" and thus inevitably "gets 
things wrong" (152). Hence, as far as Eagleton is concerned, the falsity 
of ideology ultimately consists in its effects: "The imaginary mappings 
of ideological fictions are false . . in the sense that they actually get 4




society wrong," whereas Althusser continuously tries to emphasize the 
actual cause for these misperceptions of reality, which is the humanist 
belief in something that does not exist (subjectivity) (152). Eager to 
show that Althusser also held a "rationalist" view of ideology, 
Eagleton is forced to present a reading in which ideology again comes 
very close to the traditional notion of "false consciousness," explicitly 
opposed by Althusser. This problematic is indeed inherent in Althusser's 
work. Ideology is constituted through the belief in the category of the 
subject, and albeit this belief is material in the sense that it exists and 
is lived by acting "subjects," it is nonetheless false on the content-level 
since its signified does not correspond to reality. Ideology has no 
referent, it simply creates its own. This means that ideology "has no 
outside (for itself), but at the same time . . . it is nothing but outside (for 
science and reality)" ("Ideology" 49). The "falsity" of ideology is 
merely a matter of perspective, and since the scientist Althusser lived 
in ideology but "was spoken" from the outside, he does not so much 
"oscillate" (Eagleton 152) between the different views of ideology as 
try to emphasize their interconnectedness, the fact that both must exist 
simultaneously. 
A Look In The Mirror: Lacan 
Althusser's essay on interpellation had to face a major criticism 
that concerned its temporal structure: when exactly are concrete 
individuals interpellated as subject-agents of ideology? Althusser's 
claim that individuals are "always-already" subjects suggests that 
individuals never really existed and are only a necessary theoretical 
projection of a scientific discourse that can explain the working of 
ideology only in the form of a temporal succession, when in fact "these 
things happen without any succession" ("Ideology" 49). Althusser 
simply cannot circumvent the necessity of having to narrate in order to 
explain the way in which subjects are interpellated, but the very form 
of narration, so he claims, unavoidably distorts the truth. This, however, 
seems to contradict his previous assertion concerning the specific 
nature of scientific discourse. If knowledge is to provide its own criteria 
for verification, it is absolutely essential that we take the argument itself 
literally-if Althusser does not really mean what he says, how can we 
evaluate the coherence of what is being argued for? On the level of 
discourse, the distinction between individuals and subjects must remain 
valid, even if it might not be real, but only a theoretical abstraction. 
Without this distinction, concrete individuals would have never existed 
as such, a consideration that renders interpellation itself and the 5
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discourse talking about it totally superfluous. However, with the 
distinction upheld, it is incomprehensible how the individual can 
recognize itself without having already been "a 'subject' prior to 
ideology" (Hirst 67). Althusser's moment of interpellation through the 
double mirror-structure of ideology is either an unnecessary fiction or 
it presupposes an originating subject in order to "produce" a subject- 
agent of ideology. 
It is obvious that Althusser's concept of interpellation rests on the 
idea of the "mirror-stage" as the founding moment of the "imagi- 
nary," a theory which Lacan developed in his essay "The Mirror Stage 
as Formative of the Function of the I." In a way, Lacan "avoided" the 
logical contradiction in Althusser's mirror- structure by fully subscrib- 
ing to it: on the one hand, the child's identification with its mirror-image 
(which is an "Ideal-I" functioning as the "Absolute Subject" in 
Althusser's sense) merely anticipates a wholeness that is yet to come 
and therefore results in an ambivalent relationship of the individual to 
its image. Lacan emphasizes that the idealized reflection is loved as 
much as hated: the separating distance between self and image cannot 
be entirely overcome, since it is exactly this difference that motivates 
the identification in the first place. The child can pretend to be 
"whole," but cannot act accordingly. The failure to control fully the 
other results in a frustration which causes the child to oscillate between 
different roles of identity.9 On the other hand, the identification 
retroactively posits whatever precedes the constitution of the ego; that 
which antedates the ego is a mere fantasy projected back in time after 
the look in the mirror. There is no original. Gallop shows that the 
moment of the mirror-stage "is the source not only for what follows but 
also for what precedes. . . . In other words, the self is constituted through 
anticipating what it will become, and then this anticipatory model is 
used for gauging what was before" (80-81). 
We must note that in this account the constitution of the ego seems 
to comprise only self and other without any interference from outside. 
But Lacan later added an important aspect to his mirror-essay which 
concerns the "look of the Other" as a desired acknowledgement or 
verification of the child's recognition process. It consists: 
in the gesture by which the child at the mirror, turning around to the 
person carrying it appeals with a look to the witness who decants, 
by verifying it, the recognition of the image from the jubilant 
assumption, in which, to be sure, it [such recognition] already was. 
(Cited in Weber 116) 6




This supplement changes the former dyadic structure of the child's 
recognition into a "triadic relation in which acknowledgment emanates 
not from the self-identical ego, but from the 'person who carries it,' that 
is, from the place of the Other" (Weber 118). Thus, Lacan's subject 
literally is in question: "What I seek in speech is the response of the 
other. What constitutes me as subject is my question" (Lacan 86). The 
subject is "defined in his articulation by the signifier," which "requires 
another locus--the locus of the Other" (Lacan 303 and 305). But the 
subject's attempt to express itself in language fails, because the subject 
of the enunciation and the subject of the enounced do not merge. Thus, 
against the certitude of the Cartesian subject, Lacan insists on a fading 
subject, for it is only "present" in its own discourse as a lack-it 
disappears in language. As Zizek puts it: "[T]he subject of the signifier 
is a retrospective effect of the failure of its own representation" (Zizek 
The Sublime 175). More precisely: it is the anticipation of this failure 
that retrospectively defines the subject as a void. We encounter here the 
same temporal structure as in the imaginary (in respect to the constitu- 
tion of the ego), and Lacan expresses this dialectics in the constitutional 
process of the subject through the use of the future anterior, "[t]he time 
of the ecrits" (Gallop 82). He notes: 
What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, 
since it is no more, or even the past perfect of what has been in what 
I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am 
in the process of becoming. (Lacan 86) 
Althusser, on the contrary, was much more skeptical about any history 
written in the future anterior, in which he suspected the mere reduction 
of a scientific problem to its own premises. Since knowledge is a matter 
of production, a process can only be studied with the help of principles 
that already presuppose a partially or fully developed theory of that 
process-this circle is unavoidable. But Althusser nonetheless distin- 
guishes between ideological and scientific principles at work. Having 
introduced a list of Marxist principles, which he juxtaposed to Hegelian 
ones, Althusser states: "I should add that these [Marxist] principles, 
unlike the previous ones, are not in the strict sense ideological prin- 
ciples, but scientific ones: in other words, they are not the truth of the 
process to be studied (as are all the principles of a history in the 'future 
anterior')" (For Marx 63). This could be read both ways: the principles 
of a history in the future anterior are scientific, i.e., not the "truth of," 
or ideological, because they are the "truth of " In another passage, 
however, Althusser explicitly declares the history in the "future 7
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anterior" inadequate, because it simply projects later developments 
back in time (finds in the future the "truth of ' the past), but does not 
apply them to what existed before (consider the future the "truth for" 
the past) (For Marx 75). Science must necessarily "borrow" its 
beginning, since it must start somewhere. But as it develops, it covers 
its grounds again and transforms them by accounting theoretically for 
its own genesis as well as for any other historical process. A history in 
the future anterior, by contrast, cannot explain "other things than 
itself"; it simply describes a full circle, repeating itself. Which is to say, 
Althusser would have hardly approved of Lacan's history of the subject 
had he fully understood its temporal dialectics. 
Suture and Ideology 
Althusser's appropriation of Lacan thus implements different meanings 
of the terms employed. Most importantly, Althusser's subject is remi- 
niscent of the Lacanian "ego" that Lacan defines as an object-"an 
object which fulfills a certain function that we call the imaginary 
function" (Cited in Heath 31). As such, the constitution of the ego is 
merely "the source of secondary identifications" leading to the 
"disappearance" of the subject (Lacan 2). It is thus crucial to distin- 
guish between the "I" (Je) which denotes the split subject of the 
signifier, and the ego (moi) as the imaginary self-identity of the subject. 
Althusser's concept of interpellation "is not the constitution of the 
subject . . . but an extreme confirmation of the ego or a fantasy of 'the 
subject' " (Heath 32). This also explains why "the hailed individual 
will turn around"-a "strange phenomenon" which Althusser could 
not account for theoretically and was able to explain only by referring 
to the "experience" (N.B.!) of practical telecommunication ("Ideol- 
ogy" 48). The "turning round" ofhai led individuals does not mean that 
they actually "become a subject," but that they want to be recognized 
as an object in the Lacanian sense: they hope to confirm their fantasy 
of being "whole." 
However, the differences between Althusser and Lacan still appear 
to be merely of a terminological nature: one might argue that Althusser 
does not believe in a plentitude of the subject either, since for him the 
originating "Subject" in the philosophical sense does not exist. So, 
when Althusser claims that hailed individuals become subjects, he 
means of course their illusion to be an originating subject, a fantasy 
subject, the subject as the object of ideology. Accordingly, one cannot 
understand Althusser's interpellation as taking place in the Lacanian 
"imaginary"-how could it, since interpellation works by hailing 8




individuals and thus needs language in order to function properly? 
Rather, the concept of interpellation seems "to be intimately related to 
that of suture," i.e., it always takes place as "the conjunction of 
imaginary and symbolic transactions" (Silverman 219). Suture, ac- 
cording to Miller, names the relation of the subject to the chain of its 
discourse; .. . it figures there as the element which is lacking. Thus, the 
subject "is not purely and simply absent," but takes the "form of a 
stand-in" (25f). Miller's findings are based on set-theory. Without 
attempting to follow his line of argument, it suffices in this context to 
recall that any true logical system without reference to the real must 
necessarily conceptualize an object that is not identical with itself and 
hence does not really exist as a thing.'° This impossible object, which 
Miller names the subject, needs to be evoked only in order to be 
immediately rejected as impossible by the logical discourse. The 
subject consists of pure negativity, for it literally embodies that which 
does not exist; it marks the absence of the impossible by "taking its 
place," erecting itself in the empty space. Logical discourse is consti- 
tuted on the subject as the vanishing element: "the definition of the 
subject comes down to the possibility of one signifier more" (Miller 
33). The subject, itself meaningless, enables meaning. Suture, thus, 
names the process by which the subject identifies itself with itself as the 
nonidentical; it identifies with the lack as the result of its failed 
representation. As such, the subject is built on the denial of the process 
that constitutes it. 
Since in a way ideology "functions as a discourse" (Zizek, The 
Sublime 124) insofar as it tries to establish a unified totalized field, we 
can conclude that no attempt to constitute a totality will ever succeed, 
for there is always one element too much, which is charged with 
representing nothing. Any totality literally rests on its impossibility; it 
exists only as sutured in so far as it has to exclude the one element it 
nonetheless depends upon. This "surplus One which fills out the lack, 
is the signifier which represents the subject (the void, Zero . . . )" (Zizek, 
For They Know 47). For Zizek, the subject must therefore be "strictly 
opposed to the effect of subjectivation" (Zizek, The Sublime 175). It is 
not some richness constituted by different modes of interpellation but 
a lack represented by a signifier." However, although interpellation 
does not constitute the subject, it nonetheless provides the space for it 
to emerge as a lack and simultaneously tries to cover this lack again: on 
the one hand, interpellation results in a leftover "which opens the space 
for desire and makes the Other . . . inconsistent," i.e., enables the subject 
to function as a "stand-in," while on the other hand subjectivation 
masks "a lack in the structure, a lack which is the subject" (Zizek, The 9
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Sublime 175).12 The inevitable failure of ideological interpellation 
(inevitable because any totalitarian project is sutured by an element that 
represents its impossibility) results in a lack. Ideology attempts to mask 
this lack through a fantasy, which again works through identification. 
This implies that every ideological edifice (i.e., the idea of Society as 
an organic Whole) "knows" about its own impossibility (the fact that 
it will never become real) and thus always invents a fantasy which 
explains in advance its inevitable failure. Ideology masks the real cause 
of its impossibility, the lack in its structure, by projecting it onto an 
external element that can be eliminated. The point is, of course, that 
without this external reference point, the ideological fantasy would 
immediately collapse, for it has no consistency in itself and totally 
depends on its "outside." Therefore, beyond the "mechanisms of 
imaginary and symbolic identification" we find in any ideological 
structure some "pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment" (Zizek, The 
Sublime 124). The last support of ideology is paradoxically the one 
"element that represents within it its own impossibility," since it is 
masked through identification and projected onto some positive pres- 
ence outside the ideological network (Zizek, The Sublime 127). Beyond 
identification we find-an identification. 
It is obvious that this understanding of ideology is at odds with 
Althusser's theory, according to which the ideological problematic "is 
not conscious of itself," so that everybody-except Marxists-is sunk 
in ideology (For Marx 69, 234). For Zizek, on the contrary, ideology 
is self-conscious about its falsity which leads him back to the very 
conspiracy theory Althusser rejected-the idea of Hitler, who knows 
that the totalitarian project is impossible and thus "constructs a new 
terrifying subject" (Zizek, For They Know 18) in order to "capture our 
desire" (Zizek, The Sublime 126). Of course the question arises as to 
how it was possible for Hitler not to believe in his own ideological 
fantasy. Or in general: how can ideology know about its own impossi- 
bility in advance? What enables such self-reflective knowledge? If such 
knowledge existed, one would have to conclude by analogy that the 
subject knows in advance that its representation in language will fail and 
therefore erects itself as a coherent subject knowing all along that it is 
simply a lack-"subjectivity" strikes back. "Enjoyment" is defi- 
nitely an important factor in the working of ideology, but to determine 
it as its "last support" consciously exploited by every ideological 
fantasy simply lets the question of subjectivity reappear in a different 
context-it lets the process of interpellation reappear in the picture. 
Smith, therefore, argues that we cannot regard interpellation as simply 
re-enacting the subject's entry into the symbolic. Rather, psychoana- 10




lytically informed explanations have to be "implicated back into their 
socio-historical specificity," and Smith is quite explicit about some of 
the achievements of Althusserian theory that are useful in this regard 
(i.e., the concept of interpellation itself, the materiality and the perfor- 
mance of ideology) (Smith 77). No doubt, Althusser has "misread" 
Lacan, but his misreadings have proven to be indispensable for the 
necessary modifications of Marxist theory today. 
Notes 
1. Easthope's remark is taken from a yet unpublished paper presented at a 
conference in Berkeley in May, 1992. 
2. In For Marx, for example, Althusser refers to his concept of 
"overdetermination" as being borrowed from linguistics and psychoanalysis 
(For Marx 206). Accordingly, Benton asserts that the borrowings of Althusser 
"are of particular concepts . . . and not of the whole philosophical problem- 
atic" (35). 
3. Althusser uses the expression "second degree ideology" in a slightly 
different context in order to denote the complex nature of the imaginary 
relation itself, i.e., the fact that it is not simply opposed to the "real" relation 
between men and their world, but forms a complex, overdetermined unity with 
it. I think both applications are justified. 
4. This is the example Althusser chose himself, "Ideology" 51ff. 
5. The differences between Althusser and Lacan concerning the concept of the 
`Other' are traced by Paul Smith, 20ff. 
6. See also William Connally, Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1981). Connally too argues for an anthropological dimension 
in theory that structural Marxism is merely able to suppress, but not to 
eliminate (50). 
7. An early exception is the essay "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philoso- 
phy of the Scientists," where Althusser redefines philosophy (philosophy is 
not a science, etc.) and renders the relation between ideology and science more 
problematic. See Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists 
& Other Essays (London: Verso, 1990) 69-144. For an elaborate critique of 
Althusser's rejection of empiricism and his understanding of scientific truth, 
see Steven B. Smith, Reading Althusser. An Essay on Structural Marxism 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984) 108-40; and Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour 
of Theory (London: Verso, 1987) 102ff. 11
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8. To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to note here that Althusser 
distinguishes between an "eternal" Ideology in general with its function to 
transform individuals, and its particular ideologies, i.e., the different practices 
and apparatuses Ideology employs, which historically can vary depending on 
social change. 
9. Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, 
Psychoanalytical Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject," Yale French 
Studies 55/56, 338-95. 
10. It is crucial here to distinguish between "things" and "objects," the latter 
of which are "things" subsumed under a concept of the logical system. The 
"object" functions as the signifier of the "thing" within the system, " [w]hence 
you can see the disappearance of the thing which must be effected in order for 
it to appear as object-which is the thing in so far as it is one" (Miller 27). 
11. The position Zizek rejects here is supported by Smith, who argues that 
"resistance must be regarded as the by-product of contradictions in and among 
subject-positions" caused through ideological interpellation (25). 
12. Zizek uses the terms "interpellation" and "subjectivation" alike (Zizek, 
The Sublime 181). 
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